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The "Bootstrap" Loophole: Can It Be Closed?
Frank C. Fogl, Jr.*
T HE PURPOSE OF THIS PAPER is to review the history and background of
bootstrap transactions and to determine: (1) Whether there is a
need to close the bootstrap loophole; (2) If so, why this loophole has not
been closed in the past; (3) Whether the Internal Revenue Code as it
now exists contains provisions, if used, that can close this loophole; (4)
If new legislation would be required to reach this end. A few key cases
will be reviewed and analyzed, with major emphasis placed on the recent
Clay Brown' decision, to show the attitude toward bootstrap transactions
of both the Internal Revenue Service and the courts.
What exactly is a bootstrap transaction? An early definition of a
bootstrap sale was: "A transaction in which a business, in effect, pur-
chases itself." 2 The owner receives capital gains treatment on the "sale"
for what would normally be ordinary income and yet continues to occupy
the same economic position as before the transaction. A more current
definition is: "A bootstrap acquisition is basically a three-party sale and
lease-over agreement in which a business is purchased out of its own
profits." 3
The tax effect of a bootstrap sale of a business is that capital gains
rates can result where the purchase price is paid out of the future earn-
ings of the business. However, these earnings could be taxed as ordinary
income to the purchaser before he transfers them to the seller. To secure
the advantage of having this income escape taxation before it is funnelled
to the seller, a tax-exempt purchaser is used. "Such a sale, where a
charitable organization is the purchaser, can be used to attempt to make
use of the capital gains and tax-exempt organization provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code to effectuate a higher purchase price and more
tax savings to the seller than an outright sale to a non-exempt organi-
zation would produce." 4
Typically, under a bootstrap plan where the sale of a company's
stock is made to a tax-exempt charitable organization, the corporation's'
assets are "leased" to a new operating company. The latter then pays
a major portion of the business' profits to the foundation as rent, which
the foundation in turn uses in part to pay the purchase price due the
* B.B.A., Fenn College of Cleveland State University; Account Executive, Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc.; Fourth-year student at Cleveland-Marshall
Law School of Baldwin-Wallace College.
1 Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U. S. 563, 85 S. Ct. 1162 (1965).
2 Lanning, Tax Erosion and the "Bootstrap Sale" of a Business-I and 11, 108 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 623 and 943 (1960).
3 Note, Bootstrap Acguisitions: The Next Battle, 51 Iowa L. Rev. 992 (1966).
4 Note, "Bootstrap" Sales in the Supreme Court, 40 Notre Dame Law. 304 (1965).
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original sellers. As a rule, the old company's management stays on to
run the new concern operating under the lease.
History and Background
Bootstrap transactions have existed and have been sanctioned by the
courts since the adoption of the 1939 Code. The early "sales" were made
by the original owners to a "feeder" tax-exempt corporation. This very
simple procedure was within the provisions .of the 1939 Code. The only
real questions were: (1) Was the sale eligible for capital gains treat-
ment? (2) Is the feeder corporation entitled to tax exemption under sec-
tion 101 of the 1939 Code? 5 The amendments made in 1950, although
they did not close the bootstrap loophole completely, did make this type
of bootstrap transaction more difficult. Therefore, resourceful tax law-
yers developed the "lease" bootstrap. It is interesting to note that when
the 1950 Revenue Act was being discussed, the House Bill would have
prevented many of the current abuses of exempt institutions. The Sen-
ate, however, rejected these provisions as too harsh-it felt that there
could be no objection nor use of tax evasion devices when transactions
would be forced to be carried out at arms length. Unfortunately, both
the Commissioners and the courts chose to "focus upon whether a par-
ticular transaction would be fitted within a choice of labels-'sale' or 'no
sale,' 'notes or stock,' 'assignment' or 'license,' 'sale' or 'lease'-rather
than upon examining the substance of the relationships behind such
concepts." 6
Bootstrap sale cases have certain elements in common: (1) a seller
-either a taxpayer or a corporation, (2) a buyer which is a tax-exempt
corporation, (3) sale by the first to the second of some income-producing
property, (4) the buyer does not have assets available to purchase the
property, (5) the consideration payments are made by the buyer out of
the income produced by the property purchased. The lease bootstrap
adds the feature of the tax-exempt corporation leasing the property to a
third corporation which is established solely for the purpose of operating
the property purchased. As a usual matter, the same people who oper-
ated the first corporation, control and manage the established leasing
corporation. The latter operates the property and pays a large proportion
of the earnings to the tax-exempt buyer. The buyer in turn applies a
large part of this "lease" income to the payment of the note owed to the
seller. Although this would appear on its face to be an obvious tax eva-
5 Lange, Bootstrap Financing: The Redemption Technique, 18 Tax L. Rev. 323
(1963). For purposes of the article, the author assumed that the basis of the pur-
chased assets equals their fair market value. With this assumption, he discusses
reducing the corporation's marketable size through the redemption of the shares of
selling stockholder's by the corporation. His feeling is that this does not constitute
a sham or tax-motivated device.
6 Lanning, op. cit. supra n. 1 at 627.
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol16/iss2/18
16 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (2)
sion maneuver, a look at some key cases will indicate that the courts
have managed to cloud the obvious by attaching labels to the various
transactions and showing how each one taken individually is within the
provisions (if not the spirit) of the Internal Revenue Code.
One of the first important Tax Court cases was that of Emanuel N.
Kolkey.7 Here a reducing pill business was "sold" for $4,000,000 to a new
corporation with assets of only $1,000. Of the price, $400,000 was a down-
payment obtained by drawing cash from the old business. The balance
of the price was represented by notes to be paid over a period of years.
The old owners kept full control and management of the business. Char-
ity received a total of only $43,000 from the entire transaction. Two
years later, two of the original owners purchased the notes held by the
third for less than two cents on the dollar. Judge Pierce of the Tax
Court emphasized substance over form in his decision which held that
this was not an arms-length transaction but only constituted a closed cir-
cuit. The total picture was viewed and the decision was based not upon
"labels" and "legal myths" but upon factual considerations-evidence
that indicated the retention of control and risk by the seller, the lack of
new capital or new management, the absence of effort to enforce the
notes upon default and the inflated price. The courts say, "Whether
these maneuvers are characterized as integrated steps of one transaction
. .. or in some other fashion, one thing is clear, and that is by using sev-
eral legal switches, these taxpayers connected up a closed circuit where-
by the output of ... undistributed earnings and profits must flow to the
"seller" whenever the third corporation is energized." 8
With a clear pattern set in the Kolkey decision, it would appear that
the bootstrap loophole was closed. The Commissioner need only show
that despite the legal maneuvers, the end result was a "closed circuit"
intended to serve as a tax dodge. So too, the course that the courts
should set was firmly established-that of viewing the entire transaction
rather than each individual step. However, neither the Commissioner
nor the courts chose to follow the methods that would lead to the obvious
conclusion-rather, both were determined to follow the more familiar
method of placing labels and analyzing each step of the transaction. If
the labels fit, and all the seemingly proper steps taken, the real purpose
of the sale need never be considered and the conflict could be resolved
in terms of traditional thinking. The major example of this type of case
was that of Clay Brown.9
Briefly, the major issue in Brown was whether or not there was a
real sale of assets, since the third corporation formed was substantially
owned by the sellers of the first corporation. Here again we find the
7 27 T. C. 37 (1956), aff'd. 254 F. 2d 51 (7th Cir. 1958).
8 Id. 254 F. 2d at 54 (7th Cir. 1958).
9 37 T. C. 461 (1961), aft'd. 325 F. 2d 313 (9th Cir. 1963), affd. 380 U. S. 563, 85 S. Ct.
1162 (1965).
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"closed circuit" of Kolkey-if the court and the Commissioner would
only look to the substance of the transaction instead of arguing over
technicalities of form. The Commissioner chose to assert that the trans-
action was a sham sale because of the same control being carried
through. The court found that the charity and corporation had bargained
in good-faith, at arms-length and therefore the sale was a sale. The label
''sale" was applied as soon as each step of the deal could be classified in
legalistic terms such as, "bargained in good-faith" and "at arms-length."
In affirming the Tax Court's decision in Brown, the Supreme Court
held that the transfer was a "sale" and that taxpayers were entitled to
capital gains treatment on the proceeds which were not taxable as ordi-
nary income on the basis that there had been no risk-shifting to the insti-
tute. Basically, the court claimed that it was a sale because: (1) The
price was reasonably based on the net worth and earnings of the com-
pany; (2) There was no evidence that if the price was excessive, that
resulted from the lack of risk-shifting.
What happened to Kolkey? Were the guidelines set down therein
forgotten? No, they were not. You need only to look into the Supreme
Court dissent in Brown to find them. This opinion felt that the trans-
action should not be allowed to convert ordinary income into capital
gains because: (1) The business continued under a new name only, with
no essential change in the control of its operations; (2) There had been
no significant shift of economic risk or control of business. Although this
would appear to be the better reasoning, it did not prevail since the
majority felt that the charity had bargained in good-faith, at arms-
length. Instead of the left hand passing income to the right, which would
have resulted in taxation at corporation rates, charity-in good-faith and
at arms-length-took it from the left and placed in the right. Result?
Capital gains.
Apparently, some feeling remained with the Tax Court that its
decision in Kolkey might not be fully agreed with, for it went to
great lengths to once again explain it in the case of Royal Farms
Dairy Co.10 In this case, stockholders sold all the stock to a foundation
at the suggestion of the foundation, at a price of $2,680,000, of which
$2,360,000 was to be paid by the issuance of notes. Eighty per cent of
the earnings of the new corporation were to be paid to the foundation,
ninety per cent of which were to be paid in turn upon the purchase price.
The dairy involved would have sold for less in a cash sale. In the deci-
sion resolving this case, the court points out the difference between the
Kolkey and Brown cases. In giving the matter further consideration, the
court felt that Brown did not follow Kolkey because the price did not
exceed the fair market value and the former owners never regained full
10 40 T. C. 172 (1963).
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control of the corporation. It is true that the price in Kolkey did exceed
the fair market value by four times, and the former owners did regain
control of the corporation one year after the "sale." However, the heart
of the decision was based on the "closed circuit" formed for the purpose
of evading taxes. In Royal Farms Dairy Co., the court now could strain
to apply Brown by defining this type of transfer as a sale because it
involved a real change of status from owners of the business to a holder
of security interest and contemplated ultimate relinquishment of even
the security interest within a reasonable time. It is apparent that the
Clay Brown decision has opened a Pandora's Box, so additional study
should be given to this case as it passed from court to court and ultimate
decision.
Commissioner v. Brown
In December 1961, the Tax Court handed down its decision in
Brown." This was the beginning of a journey for the case through the
courts which ended in the Supreme Court. In this case, the stockholders
in a lumber and sawmill corporation sold their stock to a charity, in
consideration for a non-interest bearing note in the amount of $1,300,000.
The agreement of sale was reached after the owners had approached the
charity through investment counselors. Immediately upon acquisition of
the stock, the charity liquidated the corporation and leased the assets
under a five year lease to a new operating company which was formed
by attorneys for the sellers. Under the terms of the lease, the new com-
pany was required to pay to the charity an amount each year equal to
eighty per cent of the net profits resulting from the use and occupancy
of the leased propefty. The charity was in turn to pay to the selling
shareholders ninety per cent of the funds received by it from the lessee
operating company.
In pursuing his attack against the sellers' right to receive capital
gains treatment, the Commissioner contended in the Tax Court that
there was no sale. Furthermore, even if in fact the sellers had sold their
stock in accordance with the numerous documents which purported to
reflect the sale, the sellers still retained such an economic interest in and
control over the property sold that the transaction should not be treated
as resulting in long-term capital gain for federal income tax purposes.
In substance, the Government's position was that the transaction was an
agreement whereby the sellers would siphon off the profits from the cor-
poration business at capital gains rates and then terminate it by having
the charity turn back the properties to the shareholders. The court held
that the facts did not support the Commissioner's contention, stating:
.. . Petitioners by the transaction here involved parted with their
11 Supra n. 9.
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equitable ownership of the assets when they transferred their stock to
the institute and became the creditors of the institute with mortgages
and a management contract as security for the payment of the purchase
price of the stock. This change of interest constitutes a change of eco-
nomic benefits thus distinguishing this case from the cases relied on by
respondent." 12 The court added, that so long as a sale to an exempt
organization of stock in a corporation engaged in a commercial business
is legal, and where it is in substance as well as in form of sale, it is not
to be ignored for tax purposes solely because the exempt organization is
willing to pay a somewhat higher price than someone else might pay.
There were six dissents in the Brown case at the Tax Court level,
with Judge Pierce speaking for the dissenters. It is of interest to note
that Judge Pierce decided the Kolkey case, which was the only major
case of this type decided in favor of the Commissioner's contention that
a sham sale had occurred. In the Brown dissent, great stress was placed
on "the trueness of the situation in the light of realities." 13 The major-
ity, as noted above, claimed to have considered the substance as well as
the form of the transaction in reaching its conclusion. However, the facts
did not appear to support the conclusion reached-at least not in the
mind of the Commissioner.
In the appellate court,1 4 the government dropped its "sham" conten-
tion and restricted itself to the argument that there was not a "sale" be-
cause certain normal aspects of a sale of a business were missing. The
alleged missing aspects, according to the government, were: (1) shift of
business risk (2) shift of benefit of income (3) shift of operational con-
trol (4) permanent shift of ownership of assets and (5) release of sellers
from business indebtedness. The circuit court said that the Tax Court's
opinion had answered the government as to all five supposedly missing
aspects.
The government carried the case to the Supreme Court where, in an
opinion written by Justice White, the Ninth Circuit's holding was
affirmed and capital gains treatment was assured to the seller. The ma-
jority opinion seemed to place great stress upon the Tax Courts' finding
that the sale price was reasonable. With this finding of fact, the sellers
were entitled to capital gains treatment of the realization upon the
increased value of a capital asset. The court then used the reasonable
price discussion to move into the risk-shifting area.
After pointing out that the Commissioner had abandoned his "sham
12 Id. at 484.
13 O'Neill, Sales of Businesses to Charities-The Brown Case and Its Aftermath, 43
Taxes, 507, 511 (1965). Methods of selling prospering businesses to charities in order
to achieve deductibility of the rental payments by the operating company and the
application of the sale label to afford to the sellers capital gains treatment are thor-
oughly discussed.
14 Upon the Government's appeal in Brown, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals af-
firmed the tax court's holding. 325 F. 2d 313 (1963).
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sale" argument in the Court of Appeals, the opinion discusses at length
the position of the government that no "sale" had taken place for tax
purposes. This argument was based principally on the theory that since
there was no risk-shifting, there could be no sale.15 The court disposed
of the Commissioner's argument by saying that to require a sale for tax
purposes to have a financially responsible buyer who undertakes to pay
the price from sources other than earnings or to require such a buyer
to make a substantial down payment seems to conflict with commercial
practice and the general understanding of what constitutes a sale. In
short, the court rejects entirely the Commissioner's suggestion that there
is no risk-shifting, hence no "sale" where the price is payable only from
the income produced by the business sold.16
Analysis of the Brown Case
Brown has become a part of tax legislation history. The issues there
involved have been settled. We have seen that this case has already been
cited as authority for other bootstrap transactions and has appeared in
Tax Court opinions. But what the real effect of this case is and will be
is still a matter of dispute.' 7 A summation of the case would appear to
be conclusive as to the legality of bootstrap sales. The Government ar-
gued before the Supreme Court that no true sale of the old company's
stock had taken place; rather, the foundation had been used as a conduit
in an attempt to convert future regular income into capital gains, taxable
at lower rates. The Supreme Court disagreed, ruling that a legitimate
transaction had occurred.
What is the effect of this decision? A search of various articles and
comments relating to Brown, indicates that the answer to this question
depends upon the writer's point of view. A simple factual analysis reads:
"The Supreme Court opinion in Brown makes it clear that capital gains
treatment results in essence from the transfer of ownership interests,
rather than being dependent in any way upon the source or method of
determination of payment." 18 Justice Goldberg, in his dissent in Brown,
states that the majority opinion by approving the bootstrap transaction
therein concerned, "legitimates considerable tax evasion," by permitting
the unwarranted conversion of ordinary income into capital gain.19
15 Note, Bootstrap Transfer of Business to Charitable Organizations, 79 Harv. L. Rev.
206 (1965). The writer looks at Clay Brown as a setback for any general doctrine of
business purpose. See generally, Rice, Judicial Techniques in Combating Tax Avoid-
ance, 51 Mich. L. Rev. 1021 (1953).
16 Note, Taxation-Seller's proceeds of "Bootstrap Sale" to Tax-Exempt Organization
Held Taxable at Capital Gains Rates, 34 Fordham L. Rev. 308 (1965).
17 See generally, Eliasberg, "Bootstrap" Sales Still Subject to Attack Despite Su-
preme Court's Holding in Brown, 23 J. Taxation 42 (1965).
18 Dauber, Jewell, and Hall, Supreme Court in Brown Allows Capital Gain on
"Bootstrap" Sale to Charity, 23 J. Taxation 2 (1965).
19 Barnett, the Struggle to Curtail Abuses by Private Foundations; New Legislation
Likely, 23 J. Taxation 300, 303 (1965).
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The taxpayers' counsel analyzes the underlying rationale and ex-
plains the importance of this case as not limited only to bootstrap sales
involving tax-exempt institutions. His feeling is that the tax-exempt
benefits claimed for the Brown transaction are no different than the tax
benefits sought in many corporate buy-outs. 2 His theory is based on the
fact that in every buy-out, every business is expected to pay for itself.
With the use of a tax-exempt corporation as buyer-feeder, the purchase
price is allowed to be repaid more quickly. "Where the purchase price
is reasonable, and where the security interest retained by the seller ter-
minates upon payment of the purchase price, there is really nothing ad-
verse which can be said about bootstrap sales." 21
Thus, some analyze Brown as merely an interesting legal develop-
men others see it as a threat to our tax program. Those closest to it
feel that this type of transaction is normal and not out of the ordinary.
One writer actually looks at Brown as a favorable deterrent to bootstrap
sales. He feels that this case "is a significant milestone in the tax law,
for it provides a checkrein. . . ." He doubts that further legislation is
required to prevent three-cornered bootstrap transactions except in the
case of sales to churches. 22 The theory is that Brown clearly defined
what would satisfy the requirements of an acceptable bootstrap sale and
that most such attempted transactions could not so qualify. The Internal
Revenue Service, however, does not agree in this opinion. It contends
that the Supreme Court did not rule on the specific point of whether the
foundation paid more for the stock than it was wGrth. So instead of lim-
iting future bootstrap challenges, it has merely pointed the Internal Rev-
enue Service in another direction. Henceforth, the Service says, it "will
continue to resist" bootstrap transactions where it finds such excessive
payments have been made.23
Despite the fact that some viewers of Brown feel that it only applies
to a few specific fact situations, or that the decision to allow capital gains
was a proper application of existing tax law, or that it has clearly de-
fined the ground so as to make further cases on the bootstrap sales point
unnecessary, it is obvious that this type transaction does take advantage
of the loophole in today's tax statutes. The question that now arises is:
How can this loophole be closed? What should the future course of con-
duct be toward bootstrap transactions?
20 Kinsey, Bootstrap and Capital Gain-a Participant's View of Commissioner v.
Clay Brown, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 581 (1965).
21 Kinsey, Behind the Scenes of Clay Brown: Taxpayer's Counsel Analyzes Under-
lying Rationale, 23 J. Taxation 68 (1965).
22 Hall, the Clay Brown Case and Related Problems, University of S. Cal. 18th An-
nual Institute on Federal Taxation 337 (1966).
23 T. I. R. No. 768 Oct. 5, 1965.
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Closing the Loophole
Since Brown, the Internal Revenue Service has announced its inten-
tion to seek judicial resolution of the problem under existing law by
focusing future attacks on operating companies and exempt foundations.
Continued attacks will be made on sellers involved in bootstrap sales
where the purchase price is in excess of the fair market value. 24 What
sections of the Code can be applied so as to help close the bootstrap
transaction loophole? The first section that comes to mind is Sec. 514,
which was specifically designed to cover bootstrapping. This section
covers business lease rents and deductions. The important aspects of this
section are those applying to income derived from a lease of an unrelated
trade or business and to the five-year lease limitation. The exceptions,
as defined by the courts, have proven to make this section ineffective.2 5
It would seem however, that even if the exceptions are read in a manner
most favorable to charitable operations, income resulting from a boot-
strap transaction would still be taxable even though such foundations
are normally considered tax-exempt. This exception reads:
No lease shall be considered a business lease if such lease is entered
into primarily for purposes which are substantially related aside
from the need of such organization for income or funds or the use
it makes of the rents derived to the exercise or performance by such
organization of its charitable, educational, or other purpose or func-
tion constituting the bases for its exemption under Section 501.26
The phrase "purposes which are substantially related" would appear to
throw out most bootstrap arrangements. That this is not in fact the result
is why the U. S. Treasury Report on Private Foundations includes
changes in this section in its list of suggested changes.21 This report will
be more thoroughly analyzed in this article.
Certain sections of the 1939 Code were carried through substantially
unchanged into the 1954 Code. Can the use of these sections, together
with the new additions in the 1954 Code, effectively end bootstrap trans-
actions? (Examples of such sections are sections 502, and 511 to 514.
Sections 1245 and 1250 are among those new sections suggested as being
deterrents to future bootstrap sales.) 2s These sections place substantial
tax liabilities upon the liquidation of a going business and such liabilities
24 Ibid.
25 Note, Capital Gain Treatment Afforded Proceeds of Sale in a Charitable Sale and
Lease-Back, 34 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 360 (1965). (Also notes that the courts were re-
luctant to close the loophole in Sec. 514 because Congress had had an opportunity
to reconsider the abuse of exempt income status and had refused to alter the Code
in accordance with the commissioner's suggestions.)
26 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 514 (b) (3) (A) (i).
27 CCH 1965 Stand. Fed. Tax. Rep. No. 12, Pt. 1, Feb. 10, 1965.
28 See generally, Hester and Eidman, Jr., Profits from Bootstrap Sale of a Corpora-
tion to a Charitable Institution are Capital Gains, 44 Texas L. Rev. 360 (1965).
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would seem to discourage bootstrap transactions in most cases.2 9 An-
other section which might be used to lessen the incentives of bootstrap
sales is Sec. 483(d). Where the deferred payments are indefinite as to
time, liability or amount-even though the parties have no intention to
pay or receive interest-this provision requires discounting of each pay-
ment when received, to the date of the original sales agreement, so as to
reflect interest at the rate of five per cent compounded semi-annually. In
the case of a substantial time lag in payout, the attractiveness of boot-
strapping to the seller will be sharply curtailed.3 0 The imputation of
interest on the payments received by the seller, if applicable to bootstrap
transactions, would certainly destroy some of the primary appeal of boot-
strapping. In analyzing the arguments propounded in the various arti-
cles supporting the use of one section of the Code or another to end boot-
strap sales, there is applicability to some certain types of transactions,
but it would appear that the use of any one section or combination of
them would not completely close the loophole.3 '
Some writers suggest that this type of sale may be eliminated
through a denial of the rental deduction claimed by the corporate-lessee
member of the transaction. 32 Since Commissioner v. Brown held that the
Internal Revenue Service's sham sale argument would be accorded no
weight in the future unless the purchase price can be shown to be un-
reasonably inflated, it would appear that in most cases the "sale" must
be conceded. If the transaction is to be attacked, another argument must
be used. Section 162 of the 1954 Code limits rental deductions to pay-
ments which are required to be made for the use or possession of prop-
erty in which the lessee has no equity.
There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on
any trade or business, including rentals or other payments required
to be made as a condition to the continued use or possession, for the
purposes of the trade or business, of property to which the taxpayer
has not taken or is not taking title or in which he has no equity.33
The important phrase is "ordinary and necessary" which allows only
reasonable sums for the purchaser to deduct as trade or business ex-
penses. This approach was applied with some success in Royal Farms
Dairy Co.,3 4 where the rental payments were reduced, and in Warren
29 See generally, Lewis, Bootstrap "Sales," Charities and Non-Charities, Corporate
Buyouts, and Clay B. Brown, 18 Tax Executive 150 (1966).
30 Note, Federal Income Taxation-Capital Gains-Payment of Purchase Price From
Anticipated Earnings, 40 Tul. L. Rev. 190 (1965).
31 Comment, Taxation-Federal Income Taxation-The Three-Party Sale and Lease-
Back, 61 Mich. L. Rev. 1140, 1157-58 (1963). Discusses various provisions of the In-
ternal Revenue Code that might be used to close the loophole with conclusions in
line with those reached in this article.
32 See generally, Note, op. cit. supra n. 3.
33 Int. Rev. Code, § 162(a) (3).
84 Supra n. 10.
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Brekke,35 where the entire rental deduction was disallowed. "In view
of the Government's defeat in Brown, it must be assumed that a vigor-
ous effort will be made to sustain the disallowance of rental deductions,
either in whole or in part, and it is highly likely that the reasonableness
of the rental figure will control." 36 In Brown, the court touches on the
rent question only obliquely, by commenting that "if the rents were de-
ductable" the charity would pay off the sale price faster and this is im-
portant to a seller who wants the balance of his price quickly. No indi-
cation of the courts' attitude toward rental deductions can be gleaned
from this, other than the use of the word "if." Does this indicate the
doubtfulness of the deduction? 37 This suggested theory of attack is in-
teresting, but, like all others, does not seem to have all the necessary
ingredients to close completely the bootstrap loophole.
In an article entitled "A Charitable Armageddon," Brown is labeled
as a tax avoidance device, pure and simple. This case is also described
as ". . . the last desperate attempt to deter bootstrap sales . . .,"38 A re-
view of most of the writings indicates that the Code as it now stands can
do little to deter bootstrap transactions. Sections 1245 and 1250, for ex-
ample, will have little effect on a business whose major assets are inven-
tory and to which depreciation is unimportant. It can almost be said that
the present Code contains provisions which may even encourage chari-
table bootstrapping. The only conclusions that can be reached are:
(1) Since charitable bootstrap sales do constitute an abuse of the
tax system, and
(2) Since the Commissioner has no effective weapons with which to
make an assault on such transactions-the courts having frus-
trated every effort, and
(3) Since further attacks on an operating company's rental deduc-
tion, or the charitable exemption, or the rental payments or the
lessor-lessee relationship would appear to have little likelihood
of success, therefore,
(4) There is a definite need for remedial legislation.
This latter conclusion has been reached by the Treasury Department and
by Representative Mills (D., Ark.) Chairman of the House Ways and
Means Committee. The Treasury Department Report on Private Foun-
dations proposes two major reforms intended to curb bootstrap trans-
actions.3 9 First, it suggests that exempt organizations be prohibited from
35 40 T. C. 789 (1963).
36 O'Neill, op. cit. supra n. 13 at 516.
37 Id. at 517.
38 Notes, a Charitable Armageddon: Commissioner v. Clay B. Brown, 13 U. C. L. A.
L. Rev. 167 (1965). A further point was made that this last attempt was not effective
because tax-exempt and non-tax-exempt purchases were not differentiated.
39 Supra n. 28.
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owning more than twenty per cent of an unrelated business. Second, it
requests a prohibition on investment borrowing by charities. Also in-
cluded in this report are less wide-sweeping reforms which would also
limit the appeal of bootstrapping by charitable organizations. 40 Section
514 could be amended to include all leases in "business leases" by re-
moving the five-year limitation. Section 511 could also be amended to
enable the Commissioner to attribute unrelated business income to re-
ligious organizations.
The new bill introduced in Congress by Representative Mills is
intended to "soften" the Supreme Court decision upholding bootstrap
transactions. Under the Mills proposal, the income received by the char-
itable organization could be taxed to it as "unrelated business income"
to the extent that the tax-exempt unit borrowed funds to finance the
purchase. The tax would not apply, however, where the business is
related to the educational, charitable or other purposes for which the
organization initially received its tax exemption. Income from existing
bootstrap transactions would be excused from the tax for five years from
the date the bill was introduced.
So it would seem that the days of the bootstrap are numbered. But
it must be remembered that the struggle to curtail abuses by private
foundations has been a long-standing one. Once before it appeared that
the tax loopholes had been less than desirable because the Congress
chose not to expressly prohibit certain transactions between a donor and
his controlled foundation. It chose to challenge such transaction only
"where there was inadequate security, or unreasonable rates of interest,
or substantial diversion of income or corpus, or excessive compensation,
or improper sales or purchase prices," 41 and used other similar impre-
cise, modifying terms in the legislation passed. The result, as time has
shown has actually served to open new and wider loopholes. A similar
result could be forthcoming if the new legislation is also filled with im-
precise terms that tax lawyers could use to good advantage.
Summary
The Internal Revenue Service has challenged a number of "boot-
strap" purchase cases, but the taxpayers have generally prevailed. These
transactions have been upheld by the courts despite the violation of at
least four claimed public policies: (1) the policy against granting tax
exemption for activities which serve private rather than public purposes;
(2) the policy against permitting tax exemption for the operation of
competitive businesses; (3) the policy that capital gains treatment is to
be given the significant economic transfers of investment-type assets and
40 See generally, Schoenfeld, Initial Impressions of the Treasury Report on Founda-
tions, 14 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 286 (1965).
41 Barnett, op. cit. supra n. 19 at 300.
12https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol16/iss2/18
16 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (2)
not to ordinary commercial or business income; (4) transactions are to
be judged on their entire substance rather than on their naked form.42
Bootstrap operations have been permitted because of the application of
"legal myths" to them by the court. Decisions have turned upon such
points as sale or no sale, retention of risk, or retention of control. The
fundamental principles of tax law-the doctrine that the retention of
control is a sign of ownership-has been ignored or weakly enforced as
the history of bootstrap cases shows. If the legal fiction of a "sale" be-
tween the owner of a company and a charity feeder is applied and the
court accepts it, all other subsequent steps are given similar validity-
even though the result often is that the original owner/seller becomes
the ultimate lessee/operator.43 This occurs even though in many cases
the courts state that the purpose of the capital gains provisions is to re-
lieve the taxpayer from excessive tax burdens on gains resulting from
a conversion of capital investments; the courts further point out that
these provisions are narrowly construed in order to protect against the
use of tax evasions devices and attempts.
The courts have seemed to become bogged down in the technicalities
and niceties of form involved in these intricate A, B, C transactions. The
Commissioners likewise have played the game on the same ground and
have attempted to refute legal myths and fictions rather than to strike
to the heart of the matter-that bootstrap sales were and are tax evasion
devices. There has been no similar problem involved in cases that re-
volved around the transfer of assets, such as leaseholds, patents and min-
eral rights. The major consideration there was whether the lump sum
payment was a substitute for what would otherwise be received as ordi-
nary income at a future time. An application of similar logic to boot-
strap transactions might well have closed the loophole, but the courts
have not been so inclined and the Commissioner has not so argued.
Apparently the Commissioner's mis-steps have permitted the boot-
strap litigation to evolve as it has. Kolkey received great attention and
was a test case that should have showed the way to block these trans-
actions-which although not a sham, were "sales" designed for tax pur-
poses.44 The principle involved is that "taxation is not so much con-
cerned with the refinements of title, as it is with actual control com-
manded over the property taxed...-.45 That bootstrap transactions violate
the spirit of the Code, and that court decisions have seemingly ignored
provisions of the Code that might be used to halt such sales, cannot be
denied. It is also apparent that the Internal Revenue Service must have
42 Lanning, op. cit. supra n. 2 at 697.
43 Id. at 634, generally describes the conflict between "Formalism and of Substance
Over Form." Conclusion is that "Many Legal Myths Are a Rationalization For Par-
ticular Interests ..
44 Supra n. 7.
45 Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U. S. 376, 378, 50 S. Ct. 336 (1930).
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help if the loophole is to be closed and the tax advantages resulted there-
from are to be curtailed. A study of the cases indicates that the Code
as it now stands cannot halt bootstrap transactions. Even when most
favorably construed toward this end, only certain fact situations could
be declared as invalid sales or transactions resulting in a tax charge to
either the seller, the feeder charity, or the resulting operating company.4 6
What is needed is forceful legislation directly aimed at bootstrapping-
legislation without qualifying phrases, without special exceptions, and
without wordage that merely would result in the opening of additional
loopholes. The far-reaching consequences of Brown have apparently
opened the eyes of responsible segments of our Government and have
led them to the conclusion that such legislation must be passed. Until
such time however, the Internal Revenue Service will be forced to con-
tinue its futile attempts to stem the tide by attempting ingenious inter-
pretations of the existing Code. Perhaps the courts will take judicial
notice of the apparent trend in the attitude toward bootstrap sales and
return to the fundamental tax principle that has successfully arrested
other tax evasion devices, the principle that substance, rather than form,
should be considered. If the end result aimed at by any transaction, no
matter how many steps it travels, is considered, rather than the steps
themselves, the decisions reached must be in favor of the Commissioner.
The courts have seldom demonstrated this ability when the complexity
of the bootstrap was being considered. It is time for the courts to re-
ceive help in seeing past the trees, so that the entire forest can be viewed.
46 Ginstling, Permissible Activities of Exempt Organizations (Other Than Founda-
tions), New York University Twenty-Fourth Annual Institute on Federal Taxation
(1966), p. 115. Note that the holding in Clay Brown has touched off a wave of ac-
tivity urging legislative reform.
14https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol16/iss2/18
